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Abstract
This paper examines the role of bank capital in monetary policy transmission in India during
the post-global financial crisis period. Empirical results show that banks with higher capital to
risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR) raise funds at a lower cost. Additionally, banks with higher CRAR
transmit monetary policy impulses smoothly, while stressed assets in the banking sector hinder
transmission. Bank recapitalisation to raise CRAR can improve the transmission; however, CRAR
above a certain threshold level may not help as the sensitivity of loan growth to monetary policy rate
reduces for banks with CRAR above the threshold. Therefore, it can be concluded that monetary
policy can influence credit supply of banks depending on their capital position.
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1 Introduction
The degree and speed of monetary policy transmission have been debated over the years in India. Banks
often face many structural and frictional issues which dampen the transmission of monetary policy.
The impediments to transmission are many, but the scourge of high non-performing assets (NPAs)
of banks has played a major role in blocking the transmission. In an environment of sustained asset
quality stress impacting the capacity of banks to lend, the government has infused capital in public
sector banks to improve their capital position and facilitate credit extension. The RBI has also deferred
the implementation of the last tranche of Capital Conservation Buffer (CCB) up to April 1, 2021 to
provide some respite to banks facing difficulty in raising additional capital in a situation of already high
provisioning requirements due to asset quality corrosion. Though these measures have helped some
public sector banks to come out of regulator’s critical purview, the bank credit grew by only 13.4 per
cent in 2018-19 and 6.1 per cent in 2019-20.
Set against the above background, it is important to examine whether bank capital matters at all
in altering monetary policy transmission in India. The recent literature recognised that the health
and the behaviour of the banking sector can alter the monetary policy effects on growth and inflation
(Gambacorta & Shin, 2018; Heuvel, 2002; Markovic, 2006). There are two different ways in which the
bank capital can change the impact of monetary policy shocks on credit supply – (a) bank lending
channel, and (b) bank capital channel. The bank lending channel operates through monetary policy
shocks directly impacting the supply of bank credit and thereby the real economy. For example,
a contractionary monetary policy by reducing the availability of funds with the banks forces banks
to readjust their portfolio by reducing their loan supply. However, the bank lending channel turns
ineffective when bank equity is at or below the regulatory minimum level for a sizeable fraction of banks
(Bernanke et al., 1991; Kashyap & Stein, 1995). This is because the banks cannot expand credit even in
the context of monetary easing if they do not have an adequate level of capital, as their ability to lend is
linked to maintenance of risk-based capital requirements. According to Heuvel (2002), “bank equity can
affect the strength of the lending channel is by mitigating the adverse-selection or moral-hazard problems
in the market for non-reservable bank liabilities”. Therefore, bank capital matters in monetary policy
transmission. Thus, the bank capital channel explains how monetary policy can affect bank lending
based on the overall capital position of a bank. Particularly, in a monetary policy tightening phase,
firms may not finance their projects with a lower internal rate of return. Also, the value of marketable
collaterals of firms may fall. As a result, the banks reduce their lending to these firms, which adversely
affect their profits with a lag. Additionally, monetary policy tightening may increase bank’s short term
borrowing costs as it adjusts interest rate with lags (i.e., interest rates on outstanding loan contracts are
sticky), which may reduce net interest margin (Bhatia, 2019). As retained earnings are part of Tier I
capital in Basel III regulation, a reduction in profits of a bank may affect the growth of its equity capital
and increase the likelihood of hitting the binding capital constraint. In such a case, banks either have to
raise fresh equity capital or reduce their loan supply to private sectors. Hence, an increase in the policy
interest rate leads to a contraction in lending by banks. The bank capital channel of monetary policy
transmission also works indirectly by impacting the cost of funds for the banks. The sensitivity of the
cost of funds to bank capital determines the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission through this
channel. A fall in cost of funds due to a rise in bank capital followed by monetary easing could help
banks to increase their credit supply. While the bank lending channel of monetary policy is extensively
examined in the literature, there are only a few studies in the context of the bank capital channel
(e.g., Bhatia, 2019; Carlson et al., 2013; Gambacorta & Shin, 2018; Heuvel, 2002). To the best of our
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knowledge, we found only one study in the Indian context that examines the bank capital channel of
monetary policy transmission (see, Bhatia, 2019). In this paper, we try to empirically examine the
benefits of bank capital, specifically capital to risk-weighted assets ratio (CRAR), in banks’ lending
behaviour in the presence of the NPAs. In line with Gambacorta & Shin (2018), our study portrays
the impact of bank capital on banks’ cost of funds and then examines whether the lower cost of funds
enable well-capitalised banks to extend more credit. Moreover, this study also reflects on the bank
capital channel of monetary policy transmission by incorporating the NPAs of banks in India.
The paper is organised as follows. The Section 2 discusses the literature on bank capital channel
of monetary policy transmission along with a brief overview of bank capital regulation in India. A
basic model has been presented in Section 3 to explain the role of equity in the credit expansion. Data,
methodology and empirical results are set out in detail in Section 4 and 5. Concluding observations are
discussed in Section 6.
2 Related Literature
The bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission stands on the view that central banks
can alter the banks’ credit supply by tightening monetary policy either through increasing reserve
requirement or raising short term interest rate. This can cut down access to loanable funds and reduce
loan extension by the banks. Although this channel looks straightforward, sometimes certain regulatory
frameworks imposed by regulators add frictions for this channel. One of them is Basel capital regulation
in 1988. Over time, several amendments have been made to this regulation such as Basel I, Basel II,
and Basel III. Under the current Basel III regulation, banks are advised to maintain 8 per cent CRAR
and 2.5 per cent CCB during normal business cycle phases. Heuvel (2002) argues that in the presence
of capital regulation when a central bank goes for expansionary monetary policy by reducing policy
rate, banks with the binding capital requirement may not channelize those additional reserves to the
private sector by extending credits. According to his argument, when banks extend credit to risky
private sector, the risk-weighted assets increase and lead to lower CRAR. Since banks face binding
capital constraint, they will fall short of regulatory capital requirement. Instead of lending to the private
sector, banks will search for risk-free investment in government bonds. This argument is known as
the capital threshold effect 1 (Borio & Zhu, 2012). This effect weakens the bank lending channel of
monetary policy transmission. Banks with higher CRAR are expected to transmit monetary policy
smoothly relative to banks with lower CRAR. Weakly capitalised banks also find it difficult to extend
credit during a monetary tightening phase because of binding capital constraint and rise in funding
costs. Therefore, the pace of transmission is expected to be higher for weakly capitalised banks during
monetary tightening phase while that is opposite in the monetary easing cycle.
Banks can raise the funds by selling bonds, certificate of deposits (CDs) etc. in the capital market
and thereby can meet the funding requirement from the market when the central bank money turns
costlier (Kashyap & Stein, 1995). Bank capital plays an important role in reducing the cost of these
funds by reducing the external risk premium. It is expected that banks with less leverage are likely to
face lower external risk premium and vice-versa. Gambacorta & Shin (2018) find evidence on a lower
risk premium for less leveraged banks for fourteen developed countries. After the Basel Accord 1988,
CRAR became one important indicator of the bank’s stability. Banks with adequate capital ratio
can raise funds with less cost and hence could maintain high loan growth (Admati & Hellwig, 2014;
1Capital threshold effect is the optimal adjustment of the portfolio by the banks to avoid meeting additional capital
requirement (due to high risk weights).
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Ellis & Flannery, 1992). For instance, Altunbas et al. (2012) note that banks with higher capital have
lower credit risk, hence face a lower risk premium. Carlson et al. (2013) establish a non-linear association
between bank lending growth and capital for U.S. banks. They find banks with relatively lower capital
ratio have a higher elasticity of lending growth to capital ratio establishing the differentiated impact of
bank capital. Thus, bank capital being a buffer against losses helps the bank to raise a fund with less risk
premium and unlock the lending channel (Kishan & Opiela, 2006). Besides the bank’s characteristics,
macroeconomic cycles also play an important role in raising funds by the bank. It is always expected
that for a stable financial system, banks’ equity should be positively associated with real GDP growth.
Opposite relationship may hold when banks adjust their payments for smoothing book value of equity
(Adrian et al., 2015; Gambacorta & Shin, 2018). Thus, the monetary policy transmission under the
bank capital channel might be impacted by the macroeconomic conditions.
The bank lending channel supports the need for higher capital above the regulatory requirement.
At the same time, as found by Carlson et al. (2013), the loans of banks with CRAR around the capital
requirement are sensitive to bank capital adjustments. These two views bring the notion of optimal
capital ratio. This optimal capital may not be static and may change along with the business cycle
(Estrella, 2004). During boom phases, the profitability of the banks may increase, which in turn may
increase the retained earnings. Since retained earning is a part of regulatory capital, this increase in
the capital of the banks helps in higher credit expansion. While in recession, it may work in reverse
direction. During a recession, capital may decline or banks may need to keep provisions for expected
future defaults. Therefore, banks with momentarily binding capital requirement may fall short of
capital. Moreover, during this phase, raising equity also becomes costly. Therefore, this cyclical nature
of capital makes it an “automatic destabiliser” (Heuvel, 2002). From the perspective of leverage,
during boom phases banks may borrow to extend credit. Therefore, leverage might be cyclical. While
Adrian et al. (2015) argue that instead of extending credit in the boom phase, banks may pay-out
some debt liabilities (by reducing equity) to lessen the leverage. In this particular case, leverage might
become countercyclical or acyclic.
Another friction that may come into play in determining the cyclical behaviour is relationship lending
and loan commitment (Bolton et al., 2016; Thakor, 2005). Using a theoretical model, Bolton et al.
(2016) show that despite the decline in equity during a recession, banks may not cut lending to their
borrowers in relationship-based lending. In the Indian context, the relationship-based lending insulates
borrower even during tighter phase of monetary policy (Bhardwaj et al., 2015). These commitments
to borrowers open up another new arena to look at bank lending from the bank capital perspective.
Because of banks’ commitment to their borrowers to lend, banks with higher capital can borrow through
external financing route to retain their creditworthy borrowers, even during monetary tightening. Thus,
capital helps in preserving the credit culture by retaining good borrowers. To meet the credit demand
for both relationship-based and transaction-based borrowers, bank capital is crucial in raising external
funds.
In the Indian context, studies on monetary policy transmission have mainly focused on interest
rate, credit, asset price, and exchange rate channels (Kapur & Behera, 2012; Khundrakpam & Jain,
2012). Mishra et al. (2016) present evidence on the existence of the credit channel in monetary policy
transmission; however, they do not find any evidence on other channels. Our study will revisit the
credit channel with capital and NPAs as explanatory variable. Pandit et al. (2006) in their study found
the existence of the credit channel through both interest rate and cash reserve ratio (CRR). Moreover,
they find public sector banks to be more active in transmitting policy shocks than the private and
foreign banks. From the bank capital channel perspective, the authors provide evidence that banks
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Notes: Kernel density plot of CRAR for different year (left) and for banks with different ownership (right).
Source: Reserve Bank of India and authors’ calculations.
with higher CRAR extend less credit. This finding contradicts the argument provided for the bank
lending channel. However, they did not incorporate the bank lending channel from banks’ fundraising
perspective. In this paper, we try to fill this gap by bringing the role of CRAR as well as NPAs in
raising funds from the capital market and loan growth for banks operating in India.
2.1 Capital Regulation and Bank Behaviour in India
Before examining the role of bank capital in monetary policy transmission, we provide a few stylized facts
on bank capital regulation in India. At the time when Basel II was on the verge of its implementation
in major economies, the financial crisis hit the globe and brought adverse shocks in its path of
implementation. After the global financial crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
amended Basel II and came up with Basel III capital regulation. Basel III recommended maintaining 8
per cent CRAR as Basel II but modified the definitions of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital, also
known as going concern capital, absorbs bank’s losses with the continuation of its activity. While Tier 2
capital is gone concern capital, i.e., it absorbs losses when the bank seizes its business activities. In
India, Basel III implementation started from April 1, 2013. Instead of 8 per cent, the RBI recommended
9 per cent of CRAR, 2.5 per cent of CCB, and countercyclical capital buffer of 0-2.5 per cent. As
of date, 1.875 percentage points of CCB has been met out of 2.5 per cent, and the last tranche has
to be maintained by April 1, 2021. Looking back to the past CRAR maintained by banks in India,
the left side plot in Figure 1 shows the Kernel density plot of CRAR for banks in our sample from
2009 onwards. Till 2013, CRAR has been taken as per the Basel II norms, and 2014 onwards as per
Basel III norms. In the density plot, all the banks in our sample have CRAR of above 8 per cent as
recommended by BCBS. After 2013, there was a downward shift in distribution towards left. This may
be due to the adoption of Basel III and consequent revision in the calculation of Tier 1 and Tier 2
capital, and exemption of capital that earlier was included against market risks. At the same time, it
can be observed that the range of CRAR distribution has increased and it is mostly bi-modal. This
implies that it is at the binding level for some banks and excess for others. This is visible on the
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Figure 2: Credit Growth and Monetary Policy
Note: Non-food credit growth versus monetary policy rate and statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) for commercial banks in
India. For monetary policy rate, repo rate has been used in the study.
Source: CMIE Economic Outlook.
right side of the plot (Figure 1). In this plot, CRAR distribution of public sector banks and private
sector banks are fully clustered in extremes, and foreign banks have distribution lying in these two
extremes. Public sector banks are maintaining CRAR near requirement as prescribed by the regulator,
while private sector banks have excess CRAR. If the bank lending channel arguments hold, one can
raise a question, whether this excess capital in private sector banks’ balance sheet helps in smoother
transmission of monetary policy?
At the economy level, the RBI has followed an easy monetary policy since January 2014 by reducing
policy rate (except a monetary policy rate hike in August 2018) and to provide more liquidity to the
banking system through reduction in statutory liquidity ratio (SLR). However, Figure 2 shows that
credit growth has not picked up with the adopted expansionary monetary policy during this period.
This signals weakening of bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. This evidence for
India looks similar to that of the United States in the early 2000s (Kishan & Opiela, 2006). This type
of unconventional behaviour of credit growth is explained by Kashyap & Stein (1995) through the cost
of raising non-deposit contracts in an imperfect capital market. According to their argument, raising
capital in an imperfect capital market may be costly for banks; therefore, banks may not meet all
the credit demand arising from the real sector. This led to lower credit growth. Watanabe (2007)
corroborates this view for Japanese banks and finds that one per cent short-fall in bank capital reduces
credit growth by 2.8 per cent. This important observation needs to be examined in the Indian context
to know whether the cost of funds lock the bank lending channel. This will bring the role of bank
capital in liquidity creation and transmission of monetary policy. In this paper, we examine the role of
bank capital in monetary policy transmission in India.
3 A Basic Model
Consider a bank with common equity level ‘e’ which wants to hold cash ‘c’. It can invest in two
independent risky investments, 1 and 2, each requiring some amount of non-negative initial capital.
Gross return of investment 1, 2 is a non-negative random variable r˜1, r˜2 with mean r1, r2 > 1 and
standard deviation σ1, σ2 respectively. The information regarding the distribution of the return is a
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public information. There is an outside option that gives risk free return rf , such that r1, r2 > rf .
Without loss of generality, we assume r1 > r2. Since projects are independent, we assume the correlation
between the returns is zero. Additionally we assume, σ1 > σ2. If the assumption on standard deviation
is not satisfied, then investment 1 is best investment with higher return and less risk. This will make
investment 2 irrelevant in decision making. Decision variable of the bank is to choose amount of
investment level k1, k2 for project 1, 2 respectively. Positive risk weights for these two investments is
denoted by (w1, w2) which are provided by the regulator to calculate risk-weighted asset for capital to
risk-weighted assets ratio. In the model we assume that
wi ∝ σ
2
i , or wi = φσ
2
i for some 0 < φ < 1
This φ is exogenous and interpreted as the sensitivity of risk weight to standard deviation of that
investment. Regulator fixes a lower bound of CRAR κ > 0 to be maintained by the bank. In this
scenario, banks asset size is c+ k1 + k2. When e < c+ k1 + k2, bank can borrow c+ k1 + k2 − e with
interest rate i (such that r1 > r2 > 1+ i). The interest rate i is a function of many variables that reflect
the soundness of the bank. Among them equity level e is an important factor. We assume that higher
equity lowers cost of funds, i.e., ∂i
∂e
≤ 0. Bank’s expected return (R) is
R = k1r1 + k2r2 − (1 + i)(c+ k1 + k2 − e) (1.1)
V ar(R) = k21σ
2
1 + k
2
2σ
2
2 (1.2)
Bank has a mean-variance preference with risk tolerance level τ > 0 given by
π = R−
1
2τ
V ar(R)
Bank’s profit maximization problem is given by,
max
k1,k2
R−
1
2τ
V ar(R) (2)
e
w1k1 + w2k2
≥ κ , k1 ≥ 0 , k2 ≥ 0
Applying Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimization principle, first order conditions imply,
k1 : τ(r1 − 1− i)− k1σ
2
1 − τλw1 + τµ1 = 0
k2 : τ(r2 − 1− i)− k2σ
2
2 − τλw2 + τµ2 = 0
λ[e− κ(w1k1 + w2k2)] = 0 , κ(w1k1 + w2k2) ≤ e
µ1k1 = 0 , k1 ≥ 0
µ2k2 = 0 , k2 ≥ 0
λ, µ1, µ2 ≥ 0
Non-binding Capital Constraint
The above optimization has an interior, non-binding solution if and only if λ = µ1 = µ2 = 0. This
implies
k∗1 =
τ(r1 − 1− i)
σ21
,
∂k∗1
∂i
=
−τ
σ21
< 0
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k∗2 =
τ(r2 − 1− i)
σ22
,
∂k∗2
∂i
=
−τ
σ22
< 0
In this case capital affects loan amount indirectly through i. Higher level e will have lower i, in turn
will increase credit growth. This solution is feasible if CRAR ratio is above the required one. And,
w1k
∗
1 + w2k
∗
2 <
e
κ
r1 + r2 <
e
τφκ
+ 2(i+ 1) , r1 > r2 > rf
The second constraint comes from our assumptions, while first comes from non-binding constraint.
Note that, when bank’s common equity level increases for a given CRAR, it expands the choice set
of investments (based on r1, r2) of the bank and increases credit expansion
2. Therefore, banks with
higher equity or less leverage are more likely to extend credit to investments that provide higher return
relative to banks with lower equity level. And also, banks with higher risk tolerance (i.e., τ , which
is exogenous to the model) invest more on risky assets. However, in presence of capital regulation,
they need to choose less risky investments. Banks with lower risk tolerance optimally choose less risky
investments, hence the impact of capital regulation on them will be relatively lower.
Next we check the impact of i on total credit, which is defined by k∗ = k∗1 + k
∗
2. By using
arithmetic-geometric mean inequality,
∂k∗
∂i
=
∂k∗1
∂i
+
∂k∗2
∂i
= −τ
(σ21 + σ
2
2)
σ21σ
2
2
< 0 (3)
An increase in funding cost through external interest rate i decreases the credit growth. As the cost
of funds increases, for given two independent projects banks extend less credit to maximize the pay-off.
Part of this cost of funds is determined by the monetary policy rate. When the central bank raises the
interest rate, it gets transmitted to the short-term money market, and in turn, raises the cost of funds
for the bank. Additionally, other bank-specific characteristics influence i in terms of risk premium. One
of these characteristics is capital. It is expected that a bank with higher capital is expected to face a
lower risk premium. This will be examined empirically for Indian case whether well-capitalized banks
face a lower cost of funds.
Binding Capital Constraint
In case of binding regulatory constraint, µ > 0 and κ(w1k1 + w2k2) = e. the first order conditions for
this are given by
τ(r1 − 1− i)− k1σ
2
1 − τλφσ
2
1 = 0
τ(r2 − 1− i)− k2σ
2
2 − τλφσ
2
2 = 0
κ(w1k1 + w2k2) = e
2In this case, we are evaluating in r1, r2 space with finite project pairs, not in k1, k2 space, which are continuous decision
variable. In case the project returns are continuously distributed, the solution will be binding, which is discussed separately.
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Solution of the above equations are
k∗1 = τ(r1 − 1− i)
σ22 + (1− φ)σ
2
1
σ21(σ
2
1 + σ
2
2)
+
e
κ(σ21 + σ
2
2)
−
τφ(r2 − 1− i)
σ21 + σ
2
2
(4.1)
k∗2 = τ(r2 − 1− i)
σ21 + (1− φ)σ
2
2
σ22(σ
2
1 + σ
2
2)
+
e
κ(σ21 + σ
2
2)
−
τφ(r1 − 1− i)
σ21 + σ
2
2
(4.2)
For a given e, if τ increases, then it reduces the credit, this in literature is knowns as “capital crunch”.
That is, insufficient capital in bank balance sheet hinders credit growth. Optimal solution stated in
Equation 4.1 and Equation 4.2 will have non-negative solution under some parametric conditions. This
has been proposed in Proposition 3.1.
Proposition 3.1. In binding capital constraint case, there always exists a non-negative feasible solution
space for (k∗1, k
∗
2).
Proof. For solution to exist i.e., k∗1, k
∗
2 ≥ 0, following parametric condition has to be satisfied.
φ2 <
(σ21
σ22
+ 1− φ
)(σ22
σ21
+ 1− φ
)
=⇒ φ2 < 1 + (1− φ)
(σ21
σ22
+
σ22
σ21
)
+ (1− φ)2
=⇒ φ2 < 1 + (1− φ)
(σ21
σ22
+
σ22
σ21
)
+ 1 + φ2 − 2φ
=⇒ 0 < (1− φ)
(σ21
σ22
+
σ22
σ21
+ 2
)
=⇒ 0 < (1− φ)
(σ1
σ2
+
σ2
σ1
)2
=⇒ φ < 1
This is always true as it has been assumed earlier in the model that 0 < φ < 1. Addition to this
σ21 + (1− φ)σ
2
2
σ22φ
> 1
=⇒ φ <
σ21
σ22
+ 1− φ
Since 0 < φ < 1 and
σ2
1
σ2
2
> 1, therefore
σ2
1
σ2
2
+ 1− φ > 1. This confirms the existence of a non-negative
solution space for the binding condition. 
Responsiveness of loan amount to capital level e is positive if
∂k∗1
∂e
≥ 0 i.e.,
1
κ
+
[
τφ−
τσ22 + τ(1− φ)σ
2
1
σ21
] ∂i
∂e
≥ 0 (5.1)
∂k∗2
∂e
≥ 0 i.e.,
1
κ
+
[
τφ−
τσ21 + τ(1− φ)σ
2
2
σ22
] ∂i
∂e
≥ 0 (5.2)
For the project 1, with capital binding condition, inequality in Equation 5.1 will hold if exactly one of
the following two conditions is satisfied,
1. φ < 12
(σ2
2
σ2
1
+ 1
)
2. φ > 12
(σ2
2
σ2
1
+ 1
)
and ∂i
∂e
≥
−σ2
1
τκ(2φσ2
2
−σ2
1
−σ2
2
)
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First condition says, if weights are less sensitive to project riskiness (i.e., the standard deviation) then
increase in equity level will increase the credit flow to risky project. That is, when risk weight sensitivity
to standard deviation is low, then extending credit to risky sector makes credit portfolio less sensitive to
project riskiness. Therefore the bank extends more credit. While second condition says, when sensitivity
of risk weight to project is very high and interest rate is less sensitive to equity level, then increase in
equity level increases the credit flow to the risky project. This might be due to high sensitivity of risk
weighted asset to project riskiness and high sensitivity of cost of funds to equity. For second project,
since φ < 1 and σ1 > σ2, therefore φ <
1
2
(σ2
1
σ2
2
+ 1
)
always holds and
∂k∗
2
∂e
≥ 0. So, for second project
(relatively safer), increase in level of equity always increase amount of credit. However for first project
(the highly risky project), depending on parametric conditions increase in equity level increases the
credit amount. This observations were from a very simple theoretical perspective. In the next section
we empirically examine the role of capital in monetary policy transmission from the perspective of
credit growth.
4 Empirical Analysis
We have used panel regressions - both dynamic panel model and fixed effect panel threshold model to
study the role of bank capital in monetary policy transmission in India. We start the empirical analysis
by documenting a few stylised facts. First, we look at the descriptive statistics to understand the nature
of bank capitalisation and asset quality of banks. Second, we examine whether bank capital reacts to
variation in business cycles. As discussed earlier, the macroeconomic situation can influence monetary
policy transmission by impacting bank equity. Therefore, it is important to know the nature of bank
capital, i.e., whether procyclical or countercyclical.
4.1 Dynamic Panel Regression
To examine this hypothesis, we use a dynamic panel model as proposed by Arellano & Bond (1991).
Formally,
yit = αi + β1yi,t−1 + β2xit + ǫit
where yit is dependent variable based on the hypothesis, xit are explanatory variables (which may
include lags) of bank i at time t, and ǫit is error term which follows a standard white noise process.
This methodology also takes care of unobserved heterogeneity. It sets up a system for each time period
with the generalized method of moments (GMM) approach and uses internal instruments, such as
lagged values for consistent estimation. The methodology is helpful when we have less number of time
points and large cross-sections. This methodology controls for bank and time fixed effects. We have
also employed the same methodology to examine: (i) the role of bank capital or leverage in reducing
the cost of funds; (ii) whether well-capitalised banks borrow more. Also, it confirms no second-order
autocorrelation and validity of lagged instruments through Hansen test (L. P. Hansen, 1982). We have
used threshold regression to find out the threshold value of CRAR to see the asymmetric impact of
capital on the cost of funds and loan supply.
4.2 Threshold Regression
We employ fixed-effect panel threshold regression model (B. E. Hansen, 1999; Wang, 2015) to estimate
the threshold level of GNPA, CRAR and TA
CE
(total assets to total common equity). Formally, the model
is represented by:
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yit = α+ β1xit ∗ I(qit < γ) + β2xit ∗ I(qit ≥ γ) + ui + eit (6)
Here, yit is dependent variable; xit is explanatory variable; ui captures the bank specific effects; and
qit is threshold variable. The interaction term contains the threshold level γ of the variable qit. When
γ is given, β1 and β2 can be estimated as in ordinary least square method. But here the objective is
to estimate γ. Therefore, a range of [γ, γ¯] is selected in bootstrapping method to find out a threshold
value of q. In this range, the γ is chosen that minimises mean adjusted residual sum of squares (e∗
′
e∗)
obtained from fixed effect model. Formally,
γˆ = argmin
γ
e∗
′
e∗ (7)
In addition to β1 and β2, γ is estimated to fit the model. This distribution of γˆ is non-standard
distribution. B. E. Hansen (1999) provided likelihood ratio estimation strategy for consistent estimator.
To test the threshold effect, it is needed to test whether β1 and β2 are statistically different. Following
hypothesis is tested in order to confirm above threshold effect,
H0 : β1 = β2 , Ha : β1 6= β2
Corresponding to above hypothesis, a F -test is undertaken for inference. This F -statistics also follows a
non-standard distribution. B. E. Hansen (1996) developed a bootstrapping method for estimation of F
value and test the hypothesis.
4.3 Data Description
The paper uses annual data for the period 2008-09 to 2017-18, taken from the Database on Indian
Economy of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). The sample consists of bank-level profit/loss account
and balance sheet data. Top 30 banks (21 public sector banks, 7 private banks, and 2 foreign banks),
constituting 91 per cent share in total bank loans and advances during 2017-18, are chosen for the
analysis. Of which, 74 per cent of total credit is by public sector banks, 16 per cent by private sector
banks, and 1 per cent by foreign banks. CRAR values for 2009-2013 are as per the Basel II norms,
and from 2014 onwards are as per Basel III norms. For business cycle proxy, Hodrick-Prescott filtered
based GDP cycle has been used. Summary statistics of the panel of 30 banks for the 10 years has been
shown in Table 1. The average CRAR level of the banks in the sample been remained at 13.30 per
cent, above the regulatory requirement of 9 per cent. Gross non-performing assets ratio (GNPA ratio)
has been positively skewed with a mean 5.39 per cent, implying the majority of the banks have GNPAs
below the mean level over the sample period. A very high standard deviation of GNPA indicates the
diverse nature of asset quality across banks. The average cost of funds (defined by interest paid to debt
outstanding) for the banks remains around 6 per cent.
Hypotheses for the bank capital channel are examined as follows. First of all, we examine whether
banks extend credit through borrowing (issuing new debt) or through their excess capital. In case banks
extend credit by borrowing, whether higher capital helps in lowering the cost of funds (debt funding)
and hence they borrow more to extend credit. Finally, we examine how monetary policy affects the loan
growth rate through this channel, and estimate the threshold level of CRAR that facilitates smooth
transmission of monetary policy.
11
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable No. of Observations Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Total Assets (in Crore) 300 463.19 546.77 2.73 12.84
CRAR (in per cent) 300 13.30 2.36 0.82 3.23
GNPA Ratio (in per cent) 300 5.39 5.35 1.76 5.72
Leverage (Debt/ Total Assets) 300 0.88 0.06 -2.47 9.66
Loan Growth Rate 270 0.12 0.12 0.00 4.41
Borrowing Growth Rate 270 0.17 0.40 0.42 6.03
Cost of Debt Funding 300 0.06 0.01 -0.44 3.08
4.4 Business Cycle and Bank Equity
A bank can finance its lending by issuing new debt or with excess equity capital. If banks issue
new debt to finance their credit, then leverage (defined by total debt to total assets ratio) should be
procyclical. Otherwise, if they finance through excess capital, then equity should be procyclical. These
two hypotheses are examined for the overall sample as well as for sub-sample covering only public sector
banks (Table 2. Negative and statistically significant coefficients of the output gap (in columns 2 and 4)
suggest that bank capital is countercyclical. On the other hand, a positive and statistically significant
coefficient of output gap with leverage (in column 3) indicates that leverage is procyclical for the overall
sample. In the case of public sector banks, leverage is not sensitive to the business cycle. As asset
quality deteriorated and banks were required to maintain higher provisioning during the time period
considered for our analysis, it is important to know how it has impacted the equity growth of banks
while examining the sensitivity of equity to the business cycle. Empirical results show that asset quality
deterioration (i.e., GNPA ratio) is positively associated with equity growth. This positive association
may be due to higher provisioning requirement and recapitalisation efforts of the government for public
sector banks, which accounts for 70 per cent of the sample.
Table 2: Business Cycle and Bank Equity
Dependent Variable Overall Sample Public Sector Banks
∆log(Equity)it Leverageit ∆log(Equity)it Leverageit
∆log(Equity)it−1 -0.0857*** -0.0118
(0.00400) (0.0156)
Output Gapt -0.0438*** 0.000730** -0.0470*** -0.000392
(0.00470) (0.000298) (0.00664) (0.000538)
GNPA Ratio it−1 0.0147*** -0.0000772*** 0.0140*** -0.000117***
(0.000348) (0.0000119) (0.000433) (0.0000206)
Leverageit−1 0.906*** 0.612***
(0.00306) (0.0638)
Constant 0.00576*** 0.0863*** -0.00166 0.356***
(0.00213) (0.00251) (0.00313) (0.0585)
N 240 270 168 189
AR(1) p-value 0.00681 0.00504 0.00822 0.000354
AR(2) p-value 0.0764 0.980 0.0853 0.0535
Hansen p-value 0.730 0.803 0.968 0.953
Note: The figures in parentheses are standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
The overall results suggest that equity is countercyclical and leverage is procyclical. Given the fact
that Indian banking system is dominated by public sector banks and they do not have excess capital as
given in Figure 1, it is difficult for them to extend credit without improving their capital position during
the downturn of the current business cycle. Also, the countercyclical nature of capital provides evidence
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that the banks are trying to raise capital to meet provisioning requirements during the downturn. Thus,
the loan growth by the banks might depend on their ability to raise fund by issuing debt contracts in
the capital market to meet the credit demand. A procyclical nature of leverage suggests that banks
finance their lending by issuing debt. Hence, we examine whether capital helps the bank in raising
external fund by lowering their cost of funds.
4.5 Bank Capital and Cost of Funds
In this section, we examine the role of equity (CRAR) in cost of debt funding. Particularly, we try to
test whether a rise in equity or a fall in leverage lead to a reduction in cost of funds for banks. The
debt funding includes the deposits and other borrowings (such as bond, interbank borrowings, etc.). In
line with Gambacorta & Shin (2018), we measure the cost of funds by using following formula:
Cost of Funds =
Interest Paid
Debt Outstanding
(8)
Interest expenses used in the analysis are the sum of interests paid on deposits, RBI / interbank
borrowings, and others. The following model has been estimated to examine the impact of CRAR on
cost of funds.
Cost of Fundit = β0 + β1 Cost of Fundi,t−1 + β2CRARi,t−1 + β3GNPA ratio + δXi,t−1 + ǫit (9)
where Xit−1 are control variables. Before proceeding to empirical exercise, we have provided the
relationship between the cost of funds and CRAR in the form of a scatter plot in Figure 3. The plot
shows a negative relationship between CRAR and cost of funds for three ownership structure (public,
private, and foreign). Slopes for public sector and private sector banks look almost similar though
it is relatively flat for the latter. Also, the clustering is clearly observed for all the three ownership
categories, which suggests for controlling bank-specific fixed effects in the empirical analysis to establish
a robust relationship between cost of funds and CRAR. Additionally, we consider the policy interest
rate as an explanatory variable as a rise (fall) in policy rate raises (reduces) cost of funds. Lagged
dependent variable is included in Equation 9 to make errors free from serial correlation. A dynamic
panel GMM model has been employed to provide efficient and consistent estimators of the above model
(Arellano & Bond, 1991).
The estimated results are presented in Table 3. The results show that a tight monetary policy leads
to higher cost of funds. An increase in leverage raises the cost, while a rise in capital position of banks
as captured in CRAR reduces the cost. Results are in line with the literature which suggests that
well-capitalised banks with lower leverage face lower cost of funds (Altunbas et al., 2010). This is one
of the benefits that banks enjoy from maintaining high capital. Hence, it can be argued that banks
should go for maintaining higher capital to reap the benefits of lower cost of debt funding.
In the case of public sector banks, the sign of the CRAR coefficient is positive but statistically
insignificant. This result is in contrast to what can be viewed from Figure 3 and possibly reflects the
rise in the capital because of a deterioration in the asset quality of the public sector banks. To remove
this endogeneity, we controlled the asset quality issue by interacting GNPAs with CRAR in a threshold
regression. The estimated threshold regression results imply that an increase in CRAR reduces the
cost of funds for public sector banks. A similar result is also found for the overall sample though the
sensitivity of CRAR is higher for public sector banks as compared to all banks in our analysis. Moreover,
the sensitivity of CRAR to cost of funds is higher if the banks have a large amount of stressed assets.
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Figure 3: CRAR and Cost of Funds
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Notes: Scatter plot showing linear fit of CRAR and cost of funds on the basis of ownership.
Source: Reserve Bank of India and authors’ calculations.
Particularly, for banks having GNPA ratio above 4.98 per cent (6.54 per cent for public sector banks), a
rise in CRAR could result in a significant reduction in costs. This implies that the market upgrades a
severely stressed bank by observing an improvement in its capital position, which rewards the bank in
the form of a reduction in its risk premia.
All the above evidences explain the benefits of implementing public sector recapitalisation policy to
revive the health of the banking sector. This result goes in line with the argument from the risk-taking
channel perspective by Altunbas et al. (2012), which says capital may be enough to absorb losses of
banks in case banks have excessive stressed assets in their balance sheets. Therefore, additional capital
is required to improve the health of bank balance sheet. Thus, capital infusion by the government can
reduce the cost of debt and may help banks to meet the credit demand by raising debt at lower cost. In
such a scenario, it is important to see whether a well-capitalised bank finds it easy to borrow externally
to extend loans. In the following sub-section, we examine the effect of CRAR and GNPAs on bank
borrowings from the capital market. This evidence will establish the hypothesis that banks with higher
CRAR borrows more to extend more credit.
4.6 Do Well-capitalised Banks Get More Funding?
The objective of maintaining CRAR is to make a bank healthier to sustain in a risky environment.
Therefore, investors buy debt contracts from this type of banks with less risk premium, which subse-
quently helps the banks to meet the excess credit demand by selling debt contracts with lower costs. At
the same time, a bank with eroded balance sheet finds it difficult to raise funds from the market with
rise in risk premia as well as market participants avoiding such banks to invest or deposit money in
that bank. Therefore, we investigate whether banks with higher CRAR or lower GNPA have higher
debt growth. The relationship between annual debt growth and CRAR as well as GNPAs is examined
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Table 3: CRAR and Cost of Funds
Dependent Variable Overall Sample Public Sector Banks
Cost of Fundsit Cost of Fundsit Cost of Fundsit Cost of Fundsit Cost of Fundsit Cost of Fundsit
Cost of Fundsit−1 0.442*** 0.445*** 0.229*** 0.407*** 0.535*** -0.0696
(0.00854) (0.0131) (0.0718) (0.0255) (0.0125) (0.0858)
CRARit−1 -0.000503*** 0.0000920
(0.0000369) (0.000113)
Monetary Policy Ratet 0.00241*** 0.00240*** 0.0315*** 0.00453*** 0.00284*** 0.00289***
(0.0000521) (0.0000603) (0.00263) (0.0000814) (0.0000770) (0.000316)
Leverageit−1 0.0315*** -0.0452
(0.00263) (0.0388)
CRARit−1 × IGNPA≤γ -0.000597* -0.00126***
(0.000338) (0.000387)
CRARit−1 × IGNPA>γ -0.000883** -0.00170***
(0.000364) (0.000419)
Constant 0.0227*** -0.0118*** 0.0420*** 0.00365 0.0495 0.0607***
(0.000960) (0.00232) (0.00669) (0.00305) (0.00235) (0.00788)
N 270 270 270 189 189 189
AR(1) Test p-value < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
AR(2) Test p-value 0.328 0.268 0.541 0.599
Hansen Test p-value 0.801 0.436 0.611 0.874
Threshold Effect Test p-value 0.07 < 0.01
Threshold Value (γ) 4.98 6.54
R2 0.41 0.30
Note: The figures in parentheses are standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
by estimating the following equations.
Debt Growthit = β0 + β1Debt Growthi,t−1 + β2CRARi,t−1 + β3GNPA ratioi,t−1 + δXi,t−1 + ǫit
(10.1)
Borrowing Growthit = β0 + β1Borrowing Growthi,t−1 + β2CRARi,t−1 + β3GNPA ratioi,t−1 + δXi,t−1 + ǫit
(10.2)
where debt refers to total outstanding borrowings of a bank through debt instruments, borrowing
includes funds raised through debt instruments, interbank borrowing, borrowings from the RBI and
deposits, and Xit−1 are control variables, viz. operating profit growth.
Table 4: Debt Growth
Dependent Variable Overall Sample Public Sector Banks
Debt Growth Rateit Debt Growth Rateit Debt Growth Rateit Debt Growth Rateit Debt Growth Rateit Debt Growth Rateit
Debt Growth Rate it−1 0.382*** 0.187*** 0.248*** 0.360*** 0.242*** 0.294***
(0.00197) (0.0227) (0.0294) (0.0420) (0.0702) (0.0369)
CRAR it−1 0.0175*** 0.0141*** 0.0135*** 0.0352*** 0.0298*** 0.0278***
(0.000706) (0.000515) (0.00139) (0.00302) (0.00354) (0.00297)
GNPA Ratio it−1 -0.00834*** -0.00606*** -0.00335*** -0.00386***
(0.000309) (0.000831) (0.00112) (0.000804)
Operating Profit it−1 0.000000131*** 0.000000132***
(9.48e-09) (1.32e-08)
Constant -0.165*** -0.0522*** -0.0707*** -0.375*** -0.276*** -0.261***
(0.0101) (0.00774) (0.0192) (0.0352) (0.0429) (0.0447)
N 240 240 240 168 168 168
AR(1) Test p-value 0.00178 0.00159 0.00144 0.00114 0.00373 0.000708
AR (2) test p-value 0.448 0.591 0.526 0.171 0.174 0.177
Hansen Test p-value 0.356 0.348 0.913 0.850 0.861 0.999
Note: The figures in parentheses are standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Both the equations are estimated using two-step system GMM estimator to deal with endogeneity (as
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Table 5: Borrowing Growth
Dependent Variable Overall Sample Public Sector Banks
Borrowing Growthit Borrowing Growthit Borrowing Growthit Borrowing Growthit Borrowing Growthit Borrowing Growthit
Borrowing Growthit−1 -0.136*** -0.184*** -0.217*** -0.0830 -0.0893 -0.129*
(0.0125) (0.0122) (0.0358) (0.0663) (0.0660) (0.0767)
CRAR it−1 0.0684*** 0.0550*** 0.0533*** 0.0932*** 0.0684*** 0.0923***
(0.00402) (0.00234) (0.00691) (0.0143) (0.0157) (0.00688)
GNPA Ratio it−1 -0.0195*** -0.0205*** -0.0102*** -0.00774***
(0.00187) (0.00353) (0.00273) (0.00280)
Operating Profitit−1 -6.96e-08 -9.63e-08
(8.83e-08) (0.000000118)
Constant -0.722*** -0.439*** -0.411*** -1.006*** -0.630*** -0.929***
(0.0566) (0.0220) (0.102) (0.167) (0.193) (0.0813)
N 240 240 240 168 168 168
AR(1) Test p-value 0.000873 0.000892 0.00173 0.0107 0.0127 0.0155
AR(2) Test p-value 0.377 0.508 0.621 0.596 0.603 0.717
Hansen Test p-value 0.531 0.419 0.928 0.894 0.989 0.999
Note: The figures in parentheses are standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
proposed by, Arellano & Bond, 1991; Blundell & Bond, 1998). Results shown in Table 4 and Table 5
say that CRAR helps in raising funds through debt instruments as well as other instruments. This may
be due to the indirect impact of a reduction in the cost of funds. As discussed earlier, higher CRAR
signals the investor about the soundness of the bank and hence they supply more funding at lower cost.
Results show that a one percentage point rise in CRAR increases debt growth rate by 1.8 percentage
points (3.5 percentage points for public sector banks). When we controlled for stressed assets, it reduces
to 1.4 percentage points (3 percentage points for public sector banks). Similarly, the sensitivity of
borrowing growth to CRAR reduces from 6.8 percentage points to 5.5 percentage points in the presence
of GNPAs, while for public sector banks it reduces from 9.3 to 6.8 percentage points. The sensitivity of
borrowings by the banks to CRAR is much higher for public sector banks as compared to all banks
in the sample. The rise in stressed assets significantly lowers the debt growth as well as borrowing
growth. For one percentage point increase in GNPA ratio results in a reduction in debt growth and
non-deposit borrowing growth by 0.8 percentage points and 1.9 percentage points, respectively. In the
case of public sector banks, it is 0.3 and 1, respectively. The lower sensitivity of borrowings to asset
quality of public sector banks reflects their ownership structure providing them an implicit insurance
to access cheap funds, despite asset quality deterioration. While a higher CRAR helps the bank in
getting more funding, but accumulated stressed assets may constraint the channel. Therefore, it is
expected that a bank with higher GNPAs are more likely to have lower credit growth because of lesser
borrowings and higher provisioning requirement. Although a bank may be relatively well capitalised
than others, if the bank needs to keep higher provisioning for rising GNPAs, then it will have lesser
loanable fund leading to low credit growth.
The sensitivity of borrowings by the banks to CRAR is much higher for public sector banks as
compared to all banks in the sample. The argument behind the channel is that higher capital helps in
borrowing by the bank to meet the credit demand. Since public sector banks lie in the lower side of the
CRAR distribution and they have implicit insurance from their ownership, additional CRAR might
result in higher borrowings compared to banks with private and foreign ownership. This non-linear
association was also observed indirectly in the literature that loan growth is more sensitive to capital for
banks lying in the lower side of the capital distribution (see, Carlson et al., 2013). The rise in stressed
assets significantly lowers the debt growth as well as borrowing growth. For one percentage point
increase in GNPA ratio results in a reduction in debt growth and non-deposit borrowing growth by 0.8
percentage points and 1.9 percentage points, respectively. In the case of public sector banks, it is 0.3 and
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Figure 4: CRAR and Loan Growth Rate
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Notes: Scatter plot showing linear fit for CRAR and Loan Growth rate (in per cent) on the basis of ownership.
Source: Reserve Bank of India and authors’ calculations.
1, respectively. The lower sensitivity of borrowings to asset quality of public sector banks reflects their
ownership structure providing them an implicit insurance to access cheap funds, despite asset quality
deterioration. While a higher CRAR helps the bank in getting more funding, but accumulated stressed
assets may constraint the channel. Therefore, it is expected that a bank with higher GNPAs are more
likely to have lower credit growth because of lesser borrowings and higher provisioning requirement.
Although a bank may be relatively well capitalised than others, if the bank needs to keep higher
provisioning for rising GNPAs, then it will have lesser loanable fund leading to low credit growth.
5 Bank Capital and Monetary Policy Transmission
While higher CRAR helps banks to access funds with lesser cost, it is worthwhile to examine whether
these funds ultimately channelise into the credit. The bank capital channel argument states that the
above benefit of CRAR in terms of lowering the cost of funds may weaken monetary policy transmission.
In this section, we examine the differential impact of monetary policy to credit supply in the presence of
different levels of CRAR. Before studying this hypothesis, we first investigate the relationship between
capital and loan growth as shown in Figure 4. On an average, there is a positive association between
banks’ loan growth rate and their CRAR. Moreover, Figure 4 indicates that public sector banks’ loan
growth rate is more sensitive to CRAR relative to private sector banks, while foreign banks show a
negative association. Overall, this graphical evidence suggests that the sensitivity of loan growth is
higher for banks lying in the lower side of CRAR distribution, as similar to Carlson et al. (2013). This
view supports the bank lending channel which argues that the rise in capital ratio helps in better
monetary policy transmission. At the same time, the presence of significant amount of stressed assets
could limit credit supply. Therefore, it needs to be examined whether the sensitivity of credit supply
to CRAR reduces in presence of GNPAs. Thus, the following dynamic panel models are estimated
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Table 6: Bank Capital and Loan Supply
Dependent Variable Overall Sample Public Sector Banks
Loan Growth Rateit Loan Growth Rateit Loan Growth Rateit Loan Growth Rateit
Loan Growth Rateit−1 0.0778*** 0.282*** 0.156** 0.271***
(0.0195) (0.0251) (0.0751) (0.0677)
CRARit−1 0.0781*** 0.121***
(0.00726) (0.0367)
GNPA Ratioit−1 -0.00861*** -0.0134*** -0.00554** -0.0115***
(0.000452) (0.000755) (0.00251) (0.00122)
MP × CRARit−1 -0.00577*** -0.0115**
(0.000963) (0.00490)
MP × TA
CE it−1 -0.00000775*** -0.00000507*
(0.00000160) (0.00000300)
Constant -0.809*** 0.286*** -1.339*** 0.296***
(0.101) (0.0130) (0.485) (0.0258)
N 240 240 168 168
AR(1) test p-value 0.000551 0.0000990 0.000396 0.000763
AR(2) test p-value 0.204 0.282 0.109 0.155
Hansen test p-value 0.553 0.710 0.300 0.978
Note: The figures in parentheses are standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
controlling for GNPAs to examine the effectiveness of monetary policy.
∆Loansit = α+ ψ∆Loansi,t−1 + φMPt−1 ∗ CRARi,t−1 + δXi,t−1 + ǫit (11.1)
∆Loansit = α+ ψ∆Loansi,t−1 + φMPt−1 ∗
(TA
CE
)
i,t−1
+ δXi,t−1 + ǫit (11.2)
where ∆ stands for annual growth rate, MP is monetary policy repo rate and Xit is a vector of
other control variables. Results of the above models are reported in Table 6. A positive and statistically
significant value of CRAR implies that an increase in CRAR leads to higher loan growth. This provides
the evidence of unlocking of the bank lending channel. For each one percentage point increase in CRAR,
there is 7.8 percentage points rise in loan growth rate. On the contrary, one percentage point increase
in GNPA ratio reduces the loan growth rate by 0.9 percentage points. Therefore, it is always an optimal
strategy for any bank to go for higher capital and lower GNPAs to experience better loan growth. As
expected, tighter monetary policy negatively influences the loan growth rate. This effect is larger for
banks with higher CRAR as captured through the interaction term (a product of MP with CRAR).
However, a statistically significant and negative coefficient of GNPA ratio signifies the weakening of
monetary policy transmission in the presence of large stressed assets. Hence, it can be concluded that
higher CRAR helps in smooth transmission of monetary policy whereas massive GNPAs in banking
sector adversely influences the channel. On the other hand, the effect of a monetary tightening is
found to be larger for a highly leveraged bank as compared to less leveraged bank as observed from the
interaction term MP× TA
CE
.
In line with the argument on bank lending channel, higher CRAR helps in unlocking the credit
channel3. On the other hand, the bank capital channel provides another justification as to why banks
with lower capital can still transmit monetary policy shocks significantly. To examine the above
3In Indian context, Verma & Herwadkar (2019) find that CRAR helps in credit growth, and 13 per cent is the optimal
level of CRAR above which the effect declines.
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Table 7: Threshold Regression Model Results
Dependent Variable Overall Sample Public Sector Banks
Loan Growth Rateit Loan Growth Rateit Loan Growth Rateit Loan Growth Rateit
Loan Growth Rateit−1 0.173** 0.197*** 0.145 0.143
(0.0711) (0.0724) (0.112) (0.113)
GNPA Ratio it−1 -0.00827*** -0.0100*** -0.00947*** -0.0112***
(0.00177) (0.00176) (0.00250) (0.00248)
MP×I(CRAR≤γ) -0.0260*** -0.0283***
(0.00499) (0.00588)
MP×I(CRAR>γ) -0.0179*** -0.0201***
(0.00527) (0.00648)
MP ×I( T A
CE
≤γ) -0.0221*** -0.0206***
(0.00523) (0.00673)
MP ×I( T A
CE
>γ) -0.0315*** -0.0318***
(0.00612) (0.00597)
Constant 0.273*** 0.298*** 0.292*** 0.345***
(0.0405) (0.0407) (0.0544) (0.0536)
N 240 240 168 168
Threshold Effect Test 0.002 0.60 0.02 0.26
Threshold Value 12.17 778.50 12.17 97.56
R2 0.48 0.40 0.54 0.50
Note: The figures in parentheses are standard errors. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
arguments, we adopt the threshold regression approach in estimating the impact of monetary policy on
the loan growth rate. As shown in Table 7, threshold variable is CRAR for the first model (in column
2 and 4) and total assets to common equity in the second model (in column 3 and 5). For all banks,
monetary policy is 1.5 times more effective if CRAR is below 12.17 per cent. The result is similar
for public sectors banks, but the sensitivity is relatively higher as compared to the overall sample.
The results are not qualitatively different when we consider the threshold variable TA
CE
. However, the
magnitude is lower when TA
CE
is below the threshold level, i.e., the banks with a higher level of common
equity relative to debt weakly transmit monetary policy. In sum, the results imply that banks are more
sensitive to monetary policy shocks if their capital position is not much greater than their regulatory
requirement level. After a threshold level, the effectiveness of monetary policy in influencing credit
supply of banks declines as monetary policy may have only a negligible effect on their profits and
thereby on their capital position.
6 Conclusions
The study finds evidence on the existence of the bank capital channel of monetary policy transmission
for India. There is a positive association between bank equity and credit growth. This finding calls for
the need for countercyclical capital buffer for the Indian banks to protect their balance sheet against
losses from changes in economic conditions during the recessionary phase. Also, banks with higher
CRAR face a lower cost of funds. The pro-cyclical nature of leverage shows that banks lend during
economic boom by raising debt fund (through deposits, borrowings) rather than using their excess
capital. Higher CRAR unlocks the bank lending channel and helps in smooth transmission of monetary
policy. However, the magnitude of transmission of monetary policy was found to be weak for banks
with CRAR higher than a certain threshold level. Presence of non-performing assets in a bank also
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weakens monetary policy transmission and lowers the loan growth rate. These results support the need
for bank capital regulation in India. Low level of CRAR not only hampers bank health but also restricts
smooth transmission of monetary policy. Injection of capital by the Government of India in public
sector banks is likely to increase the credit flow to the real sector and help in smoother transmission of
monetary policy.
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